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The consequences of the crusades to the Holy Land and Egypt are many and varied. Increasingly 
historians are recognising that they played a central role in the development of medieval western 
Europe. It should be noted, however, that it is not always easy to discern the extent of the changes 
wrought by the crusades within evolving institutions, practices, and ideas. At the same time, there 
is little doubt that the crusades impact on inter-faith relations was largely negative. Contact, often 
aggressive, existed between Catholics, Muslims, Jews, and indeed Orthodox Christians long 
before the First Crusade (1095-99). But the crusades increased the number and severity of the 
violent interactions between the different faiths, and the supposed memory of that violence is now 
used partly to justify bloodshed in the modern world. 
    The Church’s support of sacral violence long predated preaching for the First Crusade. But the 
papacy did much more than merely offer their support for Christian Holy War in 1095 and indeed 
throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. By overtly associating warfare with the defence of 
the Church and Christendom, the papacy gave war a moral dimension that had been largely 
missing before the eleventh century, and it also accentuated the clergies association with violence. 
This may lie behind the quasi-veneration of warfare witnessed in later centuries, although the 
increasing identification of war as a product of God’s will probably helped create the ethical ideals 
of knightly combat. The interaction between crusading and chivalry was always likely given that 
both shared core values, modes of thought, and behaviour. Crusading became viewed as a knightly 
service conducted for God, the ultimate overlord. This notion can of course be witnessed in the 
monastic orders, but it was also prominent in the proliferation of late medieval chivalric orders 
that had strong crusading affiliations. The impact of crusading in other areas of military life was 
not so significant. European castle design is now seen as a product of experiment and experience 
rather than the wholesale borrowing of Levantine architectural designs. Very few vital lessons 
learnt fighting in the Near East could be usefully employed against familiar western enemies.  
    Historians once maintained that crusading reinforced the papacy’s spiritual power and political 
authority. This now seems less likely: the Church had begun to centralise before 1095; the laity 
formed its own ideas about crusading; the papacy was not as influential in the lay world as was 
once thought; and the crusades were a massive drain on the papacy’s time and resources. Efficient 
papal systems of taxation, created to finance crusades, seem to have benefitted the local secular 
rulers for whom the money was actually raised rather than directly enriching the papacy. On the 
other hand, the creation of efficient, centralised governmental systems expedited the curia’s 
control over the Church. 
    Crusades were also a substantial burden for secular governments, although again they seem to 
have contributed to the centralisation and legitimisation of monarchical authority. Kings advanced 
the means of gaining central control, supply, and finance in the pursuit of crusading, which in turn 
increased their spiritual and political authority. This should not be overstated: monarchs tended to 
build on existing governmental foundations and kings often sought to legitimise their position 
through pious acts such as defending the Church and papacy. King Louis IX of France, however, 
ushered in far-reaching and radical governmental reforms in direct response to the failure of his 
first crusade (1248-52).  
    It was once thought the crusades ‘opened up’ the eastern markets and trade links to the Italian 
maritime powers. Italian activity undoubtedly increased in the eastern Mediterranean as a result 
of the crusades. Venice’s prosperity in the thirteenth century was largely a product of acquiring 
Byzantine trading posts in the wake of the conquest of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade 
(1198-1204). But Italians were already trading with Constantinople and Alexandria before 1095. 
The conquered Syrian port cities failed to attract major investment until the latter half of the twelfth 
century. Even then they could rarely compete with Constantinople’s and Alexandria’s volume of 
trade. Interestingly though, the need for crusaders to raise cash might have influenced the evolution 
of Italian credit systems, and this may have in turn added to the liquidity of an increasingly active 
market. The Italian mercantile and banking companies were certainly central to the transfer of 
bullion and credit raised to finance crusades through papal taxes in the 1270s. 
    Equally certain is the crusades impact on interfaith relations. Jews were the first victims of 
crusading zeal. The killing and robbing of European Jews was largely, although not entirely, an 
unintended product of the preaching for the first three numbered crusades. At different times the 
Jews were identified as legitimate targets to finance expeditions, and preachers augmented the 
crusaders’ personal identification with Christ’s suffering on the cross. Consequently, crusaders 
targeted Jews as a means of obtaining ready cash and in pursuit of vendetta against the perceived 
killers of Christ. The Jewish communities’ ability to recover quickly is perhaps a reflection of their 
experiences at the hands of many Christians throughout the middle ages. Unfortunate as they were, 
the attacks in 1096, 1146, and 1190 were part of a pattern anti-Semitic behaviour. That said, 
historians largely agree that the preaching for the crusades was an important factor contributing to 
the inauspicious position of many Jews in medieval society.  
    The crusades also had a detrimental affect on the relationship between the Catholic and 
Orthodox Churches. Byzantine theologians maligned Catholics even before 1095, and the 
contemporaneous geopolitical ambitions of the Normans in the Mediterranean exacerbated the 
negative perceptions of the Latin West. Armies on the first three numbered crusades suffered in 
numerous ways in Thrace and Anatolia, and treacherous Byzantines were usually blamed for the 
crusaders’ privations. Crusade historians now see the diversion to and subsequent sacking of 
Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade (1204) as the result of a series of ‘accidental’ 
occurrences. Nonetheless, the sacking is still viewed as a watershed that brought 
Catholic/Orthodox relations to a new low. The relations were outwardly healed by the reunion of 
the churches at the Council of Florence in 1439. By that time, however, the empire was on the 
verge of extinction; a powerful Byzantium would hardly have accepted the doctrine of papal 
primacy over the Orthodox Church.  
    Supposedly a legacy of folk memory, the crusades still loom large in the consciousness of much 
of the Muslim world. By the mid-twelfth century, the crusades in the Levant had led to the revival 
of jihad in the region. The Mamluk military oligarchy finally extinguished the last bastion of 
Outrémer (or the Crusader States in the East) in 1261, although crusades were then directed against 
the Anatolian Turkish emirates and their expansionist Ottoman successors. Crusade preaching 
sustained a negative image of Islam and the Prophet Muhammad throughout, although increased 
contact did lead to instances of mutual appreciation of the religious other. Muslims suffered greatly 
at the hands of crusaders, but the crusades were not anti-Islamic per se. Muslims became the 
targets of crusades because they occupied and/or threatened Jerusalem, the perceived seat of 
Christ’s patrimony, the most sacred city in Christendom and the penitential pilgrimage centre par 
excellence, and, perhaps just as importantly, the focus of Christendom’s eschatological goals. Most 
crusaders knew little of Islam and cared even less.  
    Similarly, having expelled the Christians settlers from the Levant in 1291 and then being 
subsumed into a powerful Ottoman Empire that conquered considerably more territory than the 
crusaders, the Muslims of the Near East seem to have lost interest in the crusades and forgotten 
the violence of the Christians. Folk stories of legendary heroes of resistance such as the thirteenth-
century sultan Baybars continued to be told but the tradition was hardly widespread. Very few 
eastern writers did more than just mention the crusades in passing right up until the 1860s. Faced 
with revolt and imperial disintegration in the Balkans at the end of the nineteenth century, the 
Ottoman sultan, Abdülhamit II, turned to pan-Islamism. To foster Muslim unity, he publicised his 
conviction that his contemporary European imperialists had embarked on new crusades. Late 
nineteenth-century Muslim thinkers took note and looked westwards to learn more about the 
crusade movement. By this time, the campaigns had become a ‘civilising’ source of imperial pride 
for many contemporary Europeans. Nineteenth-century imperialists began borrowing crusading 
rhetoric and imagery to describe non-pious, imperialist ventures. The idea of the crusade as an 
instrument of imperialism continued to be expressed; witness the popular imagery of returning, 
triumphant crusaders that accompanied reports of the British and French entries into Palestine, 
Syria, and Lebanon during the First World War. Arab Nationalists writing in the years immediately 
following the war rejected the pan-Islamic ideas of the now defunct Ottoman Empire. But looking 
at the West’s contemporary depiction of the crusades, they likewise suggested to their audience 
that Europe, having lost the first war in the Near East, was now embarking on another crusade 
movement. By the 1920s, the historiography of the movement had moved on and now the crusades 
were popularly seen in the West as an instrument of colonialism. Consequently, many Arab 
Nationalists presented their struggle from the English and French mandates in the East as a riposte 
to ‘imperialist’ crusades. By the 1970s, militant pan-Islamism had successfully challenged Arab 
Nationalism and in doing so effectively globalised the Nationalist interpretation of crusade history. 
Unfortunately, Muslim scholars still tend to neglect the crusade movement, although its 
historiography changed radically after the 1970s. Crusade historians now stress the pre-eminence 
of religious beliefs and values in explaining the origins and popularity of the crusades. However, 
in pursuit of a global Sunni caliphate, Islamic fundamentalists seemingly take little interest in 
modern crusade scholarship. They routinely refer to western powers as crusaders and al-Qaeda’s 
call for jihad against imperialist “crusaders” in 1998 has been repeated many times since. 
    It is tempting to draw conclusions derived from geographical congruity or superficial political 
similarity, but as any student of the crusade movement is aware, modern geopolitical conflicts in 
the Near East or anywhere else for that matter are not a legacy of the crusades. The idea of 
crusaders as imperialists is a modern construct, as is the supposed collective, Near Eastern Muslim 
memory of the crusades. Stories of the Christians’ violence in the Holy Land and Egypt were not 
repeated throughout the ages: it seems to have been of little consequence after 1291. This was not 
the case in the West where the crusades were central to the continuing development of medieval 
Europe. They contributed to the Church’s militarisation and facilitated the curia’s control over that 
institution. They probably influenced warfare’s idealised ethics and helped legitimise monarchical 
rule. At the same time, the crusades expedited the centralising tendencies of medieval governments 
and increased the Mediterranean trade and commerce of Italian maritime cities. Conversely, their 
impact on interfaith relations was entirely negative. Anti-Semitism was a feature of medieval 
Catholic society, but the preaching for the crusades gave impetus to anti-Jewish hostility. 900 
years after the first crusaders attacked Jewish communities, a number of Jews still seek apologies 
from the papacy and indeed from the Catholic world for the crusades. The relations between the 
Catholic and Orthodox Churches were stretched before 1095. Subsequent contact exacerbated 
matters and the events of 1204 still resonate amongst a small population of Greek Orthodox 
Christians. 800 years after the Fourth Crusade, Pope John Paul II felt compelled to apologise for 
the sacking of Constantinople. Nonetheless, the most apparent and certainly the most destructive 
consequence of the crusades derives from a tenuous, Islamic fundamentalist interpretation of the 
‘imperialist’ crusade movement. Acquisitive and violent most certainly, but more that anything 
else the movement was an expression of belief and devotion, incredulous as that often sounds to 
the popular reader.   
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